Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Analytical Hypothesis: W.V.O. Quine's Analytical Hypothesis is a proposal for how to solve the problem of indeterminacy of translation. The indeterminacy of translation is the idea that there is no unique way to translate a sentence from one language to another, given only the behavioral data of the speakers of those languages._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Analytical Hypothesis - Dictionary of Arguments
V 19 Translation Manual/Quine: a translation manual for a substantial part of the foreign language provides a structure in which the word is given a translation that would be compatible with its function in this larger context. Then one could probably answer the question about its reference. VI 61 Analytical Hypothesis/Translation Manual/Quine: this is more about a better or worse than a final right or wrong. As we now move away from the requirement of a congruent stimulus meaning (new), the peculiar "objectivity" that such sentences should have in themselves becomes blurred. The "objectivity is only guaranteed by the fluidity of communication and the efficiency of practical handling". VI 67 Translation/Uncertainty/Quine: there is not even any hope of achieving something like a codification of the relevant procedures, perhaps to define what should be considered a translation by specifying these manoeuvres. For this purpose, incommensurable values must be weighed against each other in these procedures. How grotesque may the interpreter, for example, let the beliefs of the natives turn out to be in order to avoid peculiarity on the part of their grammar or semantics through this chess move? VI 68 Thus two translators would hardly ever come up with two equivalent translation manuals. Thesis: it would be possible at any time for one manual to prescribe some solutions as valid that have been currently rejected by the other translator. Each translation manual basically represents its so-called "recursive" or "inductive" definition of a translation relation. It could always turn out that the German sentences, which are prescribed by the competing manuals as the translation of an indigenous sentence, are not interchangeable for each other in German contexts. Robert Kirk: he has seen that, in retrospect, linguistic differences can be provoked, but the status quo, and that alone is the most important, would be justified by the two manuals. VI 69 In principle, the thesis is even valid for everyone's native language! After all, we can even translate our own German into German in a perverted way at any time, as soon as we have two competing translation manuals for the jungle German, by translating it first into the jungle language after one manual and then into German again after the other. Incidentally, it is unlikely that the indeterminacy of the translation will make itself felt in practice at all! The linguist assumes, until proven otherwise, that his way of thinking is similar to that of the native. Radical Interpretation/Quine: it is a fact that the radical translator is forced to always put as much into the facts as he takes from them. VI 71 Analytical Hypothesis/translation manual/Quine: term by term will be translated. The problem however is that then meaningful sentences can arise, but they refer to something else. This is the inscrutability of reference. XII 50 Translation Manual/Gavagai/Quine: Gavagi does not eliminate the uncertainty between hare, hare part and hare stage. N.B.: instead of asking "is it the same?" in the foreign language, it could happen to us without knowing that we ask every time "do they belong together?" in the foreign language! The affirmative answer does not create certainty then. Even compensations with "Hareness" could occur. This is plausible because all means of individuation are structural and contextual in nature. Therefore, there can systematically be many different possibilities. >Translation/Quine, >Indeterminacy/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28